Dynamic CEO Compensation

Journal of Finance

Volumn 67, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 1603-1647

  Edmans, Alex ^a   Gabaix, Xavier ^b   Sadzik, Tomasz ^c   Sannikov, Yuliy ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84866146557     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01768.x     Document Type: Article

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