CEO compensation

Annual Review of Financial Economics

Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 75-102

  Frydman, Carola ^a   Jenter, Dirk ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Equity compensation; Executive compensation; Incentive compensation; Managerial incentives; Option compensation

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952591996     PISSN: 19411367     EISSN: 19411375     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958     Document Type: Article

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