Are U.S. CEOs paid more? New international evidence

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 323-367

  Fernandes, Nuno ^a   Ferreira, Miguel A ^b   Matos, Pedro ^c   Murphy, Kevin J ^d  

^a IMD International ^*  (Switzerland)

^b NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS   (Portugal)

^c UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84872731408     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhs122     Document Type: Article

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