Inside debt

Review of Finance

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 75-102

  Edmans, Alex ^a   Liu, Qi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78751526943     PISSN: 15723097     EISSN: 1573692X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfq008     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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