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Volumn 24, Issue 8, 2011, Pages 2822-2863

The effect of risk on the CEO market

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EID: 79960509868     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhq153     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (110)

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