A multiplicative model of optimal CEO incentives in market equilibrium

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 12, 2009, Pages 4881-4917

  Edmans, Alex ^a   Gabaix, Xavier ^b   Landier, Augustin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 73449137204     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn117     Document Type: Article

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