Why do firms use incentives that have no incentive effects?

Journal of Finance

Volumn 59, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 1619-1650

  Oyer, Paul ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344580603     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00674.x     Document Type: Review

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