CEO incentives and firm size

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 767-798

  Baker, George P ^a   Hall, Brian J ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 11144308389     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/423154     Document Type: Review

References (26)

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