Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats?

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 113, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 653-691

  Hall, Brian J ^a   Liebman, Jeffrey B ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009200691     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355398555702     Document Type: Article

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