Tractability in incentive contracting

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 9, 2011, Pages 2865-2894

  Edmans, Alex ^a   Gabaix, Xavier ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052020627     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhr044     Document Type: Article

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