Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty

Economics Letters

Volumn 53, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 291-296

  Zábojník, Ján ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

Linear incentives; Pay performance sensitivity; Principal agent

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030299455     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(96)00938-X     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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