On the Distinction Between Rationality and Intelligence: Implications for Understanding Individual Differences in Reasoning

The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages

  Stanovich, Keith E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Individual differences; Intelligence; Rationality; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 85066714515     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0022     Document Type: Chapter

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