Bayesian Rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning

Bayesian Rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-352

  Oaksford, Mike ^a   Chater, Nick ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Calculus; Cognition; Logic; Rationalism; Thought

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921775623     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524496.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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