Probability matching and strategy availability

Memory and Cognition

Volumn 38, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 667-676

  Koehler, Derek J ^a   James, Greta ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; ASSOCIATION; ATTENTION; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; INDIVIDUALITY; INTUITION; LEARNING; MALE; PROBLEM SOLVING; THINKING;

ATTENTION; CHOICE BEHAVIOR; CUES; FEMALE; HUMANS; INDIVIDUALITY; INTUITION; JUDGMENT; MALE; PROBABILITY LEARNING; PROBLEM SOLVING; THINKING;

EID: 77957568541     PISSN: 0090502X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/MC.38.6.667     Document Type: Article

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