Individual Differences in Rational Thought

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Volumn 127, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 161-188

  Stanovich, Keith E ^a   West, Richard F ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032382187     PISSN: 00963445     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0096-3445.127.2.161     Document Type: Article

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