The Rationality of Risky Decisions: A Changing Message

Theory & Psychology

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 427-452

  Kuhberger, Anton ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALZBURG   (Austria)

Author keywords

bias; choice; judgement; rationality; risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038454654     PISSN: 09593543     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0959354302012004293     Document Type: Article

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