Discrepancies between Normative and Descriptive Models of Decision Making and the Understanding/ Acceptance Principle

Cognitive Psychology

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 349-385

  Stanovich, Keith E ^a   West, Richard F ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADOLESCENT; ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; MALE; MENTAL HEALTH; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL;

ADOLESCENT; BEHAVIOR; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMANS; MALE; MENTAL HEALTH; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL;

EID: 0033127049     PISSN: 00100285     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/cogp.1998.0700     Document Type: Article

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125. Accepted October 7, 1998