Rationality and the Normative/Descriptive Distinction

Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-18

  Over, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SUNDERLAND   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Descriptive results; Evolution; Logical trees; Normative theories; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 84889304525     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9780470752937.ch1     Document Type: Chapter

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