Who uses base rates and P(D/~H)? An analysis of individual differences

Memory and Cognition

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 161-179

  Stanovich, Keith E ^a   West, Richard F ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BAYES THEOREM; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; INDIVIDUALITY; LOGIC; MALE; NORMAL HUMAN; TASK PERFORMANCE; VARIANCE;

EID: 0031940176     PISSN: 0090502X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/BF03211379     Document Type: Article

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