The fundamental computational biases of human cognition: Heuristics that (sometimes) impair decision making and problem solving

The Psychology of Problem Solving

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 291-342

  Stanovich, Keith E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 24044436339     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511615771.011     Document Type: Chapter

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