Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 90, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 152-168

  Bizjak, John M ^a   Lemmon, Michael L ^b   Naveen, Lalitha ^c  

^a PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

^c TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Benchmarking; CEO pay; Executive compensation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84997701232     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.08.007     Document Type: Article

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