Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?

Journal of Finance

Volumn 66, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 1779-1821

  Morse, Adair ^a   Nanda, Vikram ^b   Seru, Amit ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053061380     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01687.x     Document Type: Article

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