Disentangling compensation and employment risks using the behavioral agency model

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 28, Issue 10, 2007, Pages 1001-1019

  Larraza Kintana, Martin ^a   Wiseman, Robert M ^b   Gomezmejia, Luis R ^c,d   Welbourne, Theresa M ^e  

^a PUBLIC UNIVERSITY OF NAVARRE   (Spain)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d IE BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Spain)

^e UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral agency model; Executive compensation; Risk bearing; Risk taking

Indexed keywords

MATHEMATICAL MODELS; RISK ANALYSIS; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

BEHAVIORAL AGENCY MODELS; EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION; RISK BEARING; RISK TAKING;

EMPLOYMENT;

EID: 34548460619     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.624     Document Type: Article

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