Restricting CEO pay

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 1200-1220

  Dittmann, Ingolf ^a   Maug, Ernst ^b   Zhang, Dan ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Caps on pay; Executive compensation; Loss aversion

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960965877     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.007     Document Type: Article

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