Social network contingency, symbolic management, and boundary stretching

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 34, Issue 11, 2013, Pages 1367-1387

  Markõczy, Lívia ^a   Li Sun, Sunny ^b   Peng, Mike W ^a   Shi, Weilei ^c   Ren, Bing ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI KANSAS CITY   (United States)

^c CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^d NANKAI UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

CEO compensation; China; corporate interlocks; symbolic management

Indexed keywords

CEO COMPENSATIONS; CHINA; CORPORATE INTERLOCKS; CORPORATE NETWORKS; MANAGEMENT TOOL; NETWORK CONTINGENCIES; SOCIAL NORM; STRUCTURAL HOLES;

MANAGEMENT; PLANNING;

INDUSTRY;

EID: 84884283169     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2072     Document Type: Article

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