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Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 1132-1157

Us knows us in the UK: On director networks and CEO compensation

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Executive remuneration; Managerial power; Professional and social networks; Remuneration consultants

Indexed keywords


EID: 79960934529     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.011     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (128)

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