Personnel economics

The Handbook of Organizational Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 479-519

  Lazear, Edward P ^a,b   Oyer, Paul ^c  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84940854485     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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