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Volumn 63, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 641-661

An empirical analysis of risk, incentives and the delegation of worker authority

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EID: 77954801505     PISSN: 00197939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/001979391006300405     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (43)

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