Opportunity counts: Teams and the effectiveness of production incentives

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 613-650

  Boning, Brent ^a   Ichniowski, Casey ^b   Shaw, Kathryn ^c  

^a CNA CORPORATION   (United States)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35348920284     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/519539     Document Type: Article

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