Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 82, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 197-225

  Garvey, Gerald T ^a   Milbourn, Todd T ^b  

^a Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well Being   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

Benchmarking; CEO compensation; Pay for luck

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748090573     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.01.006     Document Type: Article

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