The provision of incentives in firms

Journal of Economic Literature

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 7-63

  Prendergast, Canice ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0009480521     PISSN: 00220515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/jel.37.1.7     Document Type: Article

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