Chapter 38 Executive compensation

Handbook of Labor Economics

Volumn 3 PART, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 2485-2563

  Murphy, Kevin J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951519785     PISSN: 15734463     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1573-4463(99)30024-9     Document Type: Review

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