Work-related perks, agency problems, and optimal incentive contracts

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 565-585

  Marino, Anthony M ^a   Zábojnfk, Ján ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 47649110528     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00028.x     Document Type: Article

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