Are perks purely managerial excess?

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 79, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 1-33

  Rajan, Raghuram G ^a,b   Wulf, Julie ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Executive compensation; Perquisites; Private benefits

Indexed keywords

EID: 29244445811     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.01.003     Document Type: Article

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