Chapter 35 Individual employment contracts

Handbook of Labor Economics

Volumn 3 PART, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 2291-2372

  Malcomson, James M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 77956721367     PISSN: 15734463     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1573-4463(99)30021-3     Document Type: Review

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