Relational contracts, multitasking, and job design

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 138-162

  Schöttner, Anja ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 52449105953     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewm044     Document Type: Article

References (42)

1. Baker, G. P. 2002. "Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts," 37 Journal of Human Resources 728-51.
2. Baker, G. P., R. Gibbons, and K. J. Murphy. 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," 109 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1125-56.
3. _. 2002. "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," 117 Quarterly Journal of Economics 39-84.
4. Bernheim, B. D., and M. D. Whinston. 1998. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," 88 American Economic Review 902-32.
5. Bull, C. 1987. "The Existence of Self-enforcing Relational Contracts," 102 Quarterly Journal of Economics 147-60.
6. Caroli, E., and J. van Reenen. 2001. "Skill-Biased Organizational Change? Evidence from a Panel of British and French Establishments," 116 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1449-92.
7. Che, Y.-K., and S.-W. Yoo. 2001. "Optimal Incentives for Teams," 91 American Economic Review 525-41.
8. Datar, S., S. Kulp, and R. Lambert. 2001. "Balancing Performance Measures," 39 Journal of Accounting Research 75-92.
9. Demougin, D., and O. Fabel. 2004. "The Determinants of Salary and Bonus for Rank and File Managers." Discussion Paper of the Department of Economics - Series I (Green Series), No. 327, University of Konstanz.
10. Dessein, W., and T. Santos. 2003. "The Demand for Coordination." NBER Working Paper Series No. 10056.
11. Dorenbosch, L., M. L. van Engen, and M. Verhagen. 2005. "On-the-Job Innovation: The Impact of Job Design and Human Resource Management Through Production Ownership," 14 Creativity and Innovation Management 129-41.
12. Fast, N. D., and N. A. Berg. 1975. "Lincoln Electric Co." Havard Business School Case 376028.
13. Feltham, G. A., and J. Xie. 1994. "Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-task Principal/Agent Relations," 69 Accounting Review 429-53.
14. Gibbons, R. 2005. "Incentives Between Firms (and Within)," 51 Management Science 2-17.
15. Gibbs, M., K. A. Merchant, W. A. van der Stede, and M. E. Vargus. 2004. "Performance Measure Properties and Incentives." IZA Discussion Paper No. 1356.
16. Gürtler, O. 2006. "On Delegation Under Relational Contracts." SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 113.
17. Hayes, R., and S. Schaefer. 2000. "Implicit Contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance," 31 RAND Journal of Economics 273-93.
18. Holmström, B. 1981. "Contractual Models of the Labor Market," 71 American Economic Review 308-13.
19. Holmström, B., and P. Milgrom. 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," 7 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (Special Issue) 24-52.
20. Hughes, J. S., L. Zhang, and J. Xie. 2005. "Production Externalities, Congruity of Aggregate Signals, and Optimal Task Assignments," 22 Contemporary Accounting Research 393-408.
21. Itoh, H. 1994. "Job Design, Delegation and Cooperation: A Principal-Agent Analysis," 38 European Economic Review 691-700.
22. _. 2001. "Job Design and Incentives in Hierarchies with Team Production," 36 Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce and Management 1-17.
23. Kerr, S. 1975. "On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B," 18 The Academy of Management Journal 769-83.
24. Klein, B. 1996. "Why Hold-ups Occur: The Self-enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships," 34 Economic Inquiry 444-63.
25. Lazear, E. P. 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," 90 American Economic Review 1346-61.
26. Levin, J. 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," 93 American Economic Review 835-57.
27. Lindbeck, A., and D. J. Snower. 2000. "Multitask Learning and the Reorganization of Work: From Tayloristic to Holistic Organization," 18 Journal of Labor Economics 353-76.
28. _. 2001. "Centralized Bargaining and Reorganized Work: Are They Compatible?," 45 European Economic Review 1851-75.
29. Lütkepohl, H. 1996. Handbook of Matrices. John Wiley.
30. MacLeod, W. B. 2003. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," 93 American Economic Review 216-40.
31. MacLeod, W. B., and J. M. Malcomson. 1989. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment," 57 Econometrica 447-80.
32. _. 1993. "Wage Premiums and Profit Maximization in Efficiency Wage Models," 37 European Economic Review 1223-49.
33. _. 1998. "Motivation and Markets," 88 American Economic Review 388-411.
34. Meyer, M. A., T. E. Olsen, and G. Torsvik. 1996. "Limited Intertemporal Commitment and Job Design," 31 Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 401-17.
35. Murphy, K. J., and P. Oyer. 2003. "Discretion in Executive Incentive Contracts." Working Paper.
36. Olsen, T. E., and G. Torsvik. 2000. "Discretion and Incentives in Organizations," 18 Journal of Labor Economics 377-404.
37. Pearce, D. G., and E. Stacchetti. 1998. "The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency," 23 Games and Economic Behavior 75-96.
38. Schmidt, K. M., and M. Schnitzer. 1995. "The Interaction of Explicit and Implicit Contracts," 48 Economics Letters 193-9.
39. Schnedler, W. 2006. "Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-off Between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort." IZA Discussion Paper No. 2124.
40. Thiele, V. 2006. "Task-Specific Abilities in Multi-task Agency Relations." Working Paper, University of British Columbia.
41. Zhang, L. 2003. "Complementarity, Task Assignment, and Incentives," 15 Journal of Management Accounting Research 225-46.
42. Zoghi, C., A. Levenson, and M. Gibbs. 2005. "Why Are Jobs Designed the Way They Are?" IZA Discussion Paper No. 1529.