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Review of Economic Studies
Volumn 66, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 169-182
Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective
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[No Author keywords available]
Indexed keywords

EID: 4243442002     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00083     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (1587)
References (15)
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    • Harris, M.1    Raviv, A.2
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  • 8
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  • 9
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  • 10
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    • ROSEN, S. (1982), "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings", Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 311-323.
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    • The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem
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  • 12
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  • 15
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.