Internal promotion competitions in firms

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 521-542

  DeVaro, Jed ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247225979     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00029.x     Document Type: Article

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