Performance, promotion, and the Peter principle

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 45-66

  Fairburn, James A ^a,b   Malcomson, James M ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORPORATE STRATEGY; MANAGEMENT PRACTICE; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT;

EID: 0035046038     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00159     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from personnel data
2. The wage policy of a firm
3. Compensation and incentives: Practice vs. theory
4. Strategic promotion and compensation
5. Promotion, turnover, and preemptive wage offers
6. Firm-specific human capital and promotion ladders
7. Competition over more than one prize
8. Career paths and incentives in organizations
9. Rewarding performance by promotion to a different job
10. Optimal incentive schemes in the presence of career concerns: Theory and evidence
11. Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence
12. Incentive compensation in a corporate Hierarchy
13. A comparison of tournaments and contracts
14. The theory of contracts
15. Moral hazard in teams
16. Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective
17. Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
18. Two-sided uncertainty and 'up-or-out' contracts
19. Corporate culture and economic theory
20. The firm as a multicontract organization
21. The job as a concept
22. Rank-order tournaments as optimal labor contracts
23. Reputation and hierarchy in dynamic models of employment
24. Work incentives, hierarchy, and internal labor markets
25. Rank-order contracts for a principal with many agents
26. Learning from coarse information: Biased contests and career profiles
27. Employment contracts, influence activities, and efficient organization design
28. An economic approach to influence activities in organization
29. Promotion careers with multiple punitive assignments
30. Prizes and incentives: Towards a general theory of compensation and competition
31. The role of promotion in inducing specific human capital acquisition
32. The provision of incentives in firms
33. Favoritism in organizations
34. Monitoring cooperative agreements in a repeated principal-agent relationship
35. Repeated principal-agent games with discounting
36. Managerial task assingment and promotions
37. Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments
38. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations
39. Collusion and the theory of organizations
40. Job assignments, signalling, and efficiency
41. Up-or-out contracts: A signaling perspective