Optimal contracting with subjective evaluation

American Economic Review

Volumn 93, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 216-240

  MacLeod, W Bentley ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2942746580     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/000282803321455232     Document Type: Article

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