Chapter 36 Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence

Handbook of Labor Economics

Volumn 3 PART, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 2373-2437

  Gibbons, Robert ^a   Waldman, Michael ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b SAS Institute Inc

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956764654     PISSN: 15734463     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1573-4463(99)30022-5     Document Type: Review

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