The economics of relationships

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, Volume I

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 136-185

  Samuelson, Larry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924154717     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139052269.006     Document Type: Chapter

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