Analogies, adaptation, and anomalies

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 97, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 320-366

  Samuelson, Larry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Analogies; Bargaining; Bounded rationality; Complexity; Evolution

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035314837     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2754     Document Type: Article

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