Informal insurance arrangements with limited commitment: Theory and evidence from village economies

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 209-244

  Ligon, Ethan ^a   Thomas, Jonathan P ^b   Worrall, Tim ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

^c KEELE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR; INFORMAL SECTOR; INSURANCE INDUSTRY;

INDIA;

EID: 0036176877     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00204     Document Type: Article

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