Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent

Econometrica

Volumn 64, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 691-704

  Celentani, Marco ^a   Fudenberg, Drew ^a   Levine, David K ^a   Pesendorfer, Wolfgang ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY;

EID: 0030366952     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171867     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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4. CELENTANI, M., D. FUDENBERG, D. K. LEVINE, AND W. PESENDORFER (1993): "Maintaining a Reputation Against a Patient Opponent," CMSEMS Discussion Paper No. 1075, Northwestern University.
5. CRIPPS, M., K. SCHMIDT, AND J. P. THOMAS (1996): "Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
6. CRIPPS, M., AND J. P. THOMAS (1993): "Reputation and Perfection in a Repeated Common Interest Game," mimeo.
7. _ (1994): "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Two-Person Repeated Games without Discounting," mimeo.
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11. _ (1992): "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Review of Economic Studies, 59, 561-579.
12. FUDENBERG, D., AND J. TIROLE (1991): "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, 53, 236-260.
13. KREPS, D. M., AND R. WILSON (1982): "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 253-279.
14. MILGROM, P., AND J. ROBERTS (1982): "Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 280-312.
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16. _ (1985): "Repeated Principal Agent Games with Discounting," Econometrica, 53, 1173-1198.
17. SCHMIDT, K. (1993): "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests," Econometrica, 61, 325-351.