Reputation and experimentation in repeated games with two long-run players

Econometrica

Volumn 65, Issue 5, 1997, Pages 1153-1173

  Evans, Robert ^a   Thomas, Jonathan P ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Commitment; Experimentation; Incomplete information; Repeated games; Reputation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345727440     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171882     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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10. WATSON, J. (1996): "Reputation in Repeated Games with No Discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, 15, 82-109.