The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 99-122

  Mailath, George J ^a   Obara, Ichiro ^a   Sekiguchi, Tadashi ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b KOBE UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Equilibrium payoffs; Perfect monitoring; Repeated games; Repeated Prisoners' dilemma

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036331306     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2001.0901     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. "Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames"
2. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring"
3. "Equilibrium and Perfection in Discounted Supergames"
4. "Strongly Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring and Discounting"
5. "On Repeated Games with Complete Information"
6. "The Graph of Prisoners' Dilemma Supergame Payoffs as a Function of the Discount Factor"