Reputation in dynamic games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 109-132

  Celentani, Marco ^a   Pesendorfer, Wolfgang ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030188346     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0078     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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