Belief-free equilibria in repeated games

Econometrica

Volumn 73, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 377-415

  Ely, Jeffrey C ^a   Hörner, Johannes ^a   Olszewski, Wojciech ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Folk theorem; Private monitoring; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744460948     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00583.x     Document Type: Review

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