Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 63, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 595-609

  Kocherlakota, Narayana R ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001105480     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2297795     Document Type: Article

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